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Evidence of a decline in public trust associated with food risk governance over recent years has called into
question the appropriateness of the current dominant risk analysis framework. Within the EU-funded
SAFE FOODS project a novel risk analysis framework has been developed that attempts to address poten-
tial shortcomings by increasing stakeholder (including consumer) input, improving transparency, and
formally incorporating beneﬁt and non-health aspects into the analysis. To assess the viability of this
novel framework, the views of food risk experts from the EU and beyond were sought using a distributed
online questionnaire process called Delphi. In this paper the main results of this survey are described,
revealing varying levels of support for the key innovations of the novel framework. Implications of our
results for the new and old frameworks, for the future of risk analysis, and for the policy community more
widely, are discussed.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1 Exceptions to this general approach can be identiﬁed. For example, the
acceptability of sodium nitrate as a food preservative has been evaluated (Branen
et al., 2002). Some risk assessors have concluded that the potential (but small) long-Introduction
Food risk analysis is currently the responsibility and preserve of
expert risk assessors and professional risk managers. However, re-
cent years have seen a decline in public trust in risk governance,
particularly in the food domain, related to a number of high-proﬁle
food crises (e.g., Houghton et al., 2008). Recognition of this decline
has led to moves by national and international responsible bodies
(such as the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA) to attempt to
increase public conﬁdence in the risk analysis process by (for
example), improving the transparency of risk analysis practices
through increasing stakeholder (including consumer) input into
the decision-making process. The institutionalisation of these prac-
tises has, largely been on an ad hoc basis. The impact of increased
transparency and enhanced stakeholder engagement on consumer
conﬁdence has yet to be systematically evaluated (see Rowe,
2007). Additionally, there are a number of other factors not cur-
rently incorporated within the formal food risk analysis process
(which focuses on risk to human health) that arguably should be ta-
ken into account. These include environmental, social, economic,
and ethical impacts. By implication, the term ‘‘impact” incorpo-
rates assessment of both risk and beneﬁt, as both are possible out-
comes of many potentially hazardous events. However, the currentll rights reserved.
; fax: +31 7 48 43 61.
entholt).risk analysis framework tends to focus on risks, excluding consid-
eration of beneﬁts.1
The Framework VI EU-funded SAFE FOODS project (2004–2008)
has aimed to develop an improved risk governance framework for
foods that explicitly incorporates stakeholder consultation, public
participation, and risk–beneﬁt assessment. In addition, the frame-
work formally considers the question of whether to include assess-
ments related to non-human health aspects, such as environmental,
socio-economic and ethical impacts. Emphasis is placed on en-
hanced transparency throughout the process.
In this paper we describe how, in the course of developing the
food risk analysis framework, expert opinion was sought through
a speciﬁc iterative, distributed method. Following elaboration on
the issue of risk analysis and the potential problems associated
with the dominant contemporary framework, a more integrated
risk analysis framework is presented. The problems of acquiring
expert opinion on such an important issue are outlined. One partic-
ular approach for overcoming some of these difﬁculties, the Delphiterm risks of cancer from the formation of nitrosamines is outweighed by the
antibacterial beneﬁts of the use of the preservative. Similarly, the risks from some
fungicides, such as the Ethylene bisdithiocarbamates, and their metabolite ethylen-
ethiourea, have been discounted because of the presumed beneﬁts of reduced food
losses due to spoilage (Schneider and Dickert, 1993).
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cess is then outlined, and selected results are presented. The views
of interested actors and stakeholders regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of the framework are provided, together with views
on its further development, along with commentary on the useful-
ness and limitations of the Delphi research method.
Food risk analysis: processes and problems
The dominant framework of risk analysis applied in the agri-
food sector (FAO/WHO, 1995) comprises of three components:
food risk assessment, food risk management and food risk commu-
nication. Risk assessment focuses on the systematic and objective
evaluation of all available information pertaining to foodborne
hazards. Food risk management aims to optimise protection of pub-
lic health by controlling risks effectively through the selection and
implementation of appropriate measures. It is within the remit of
risk managers to consider various legal, political, social and eco-
nomic issues, such as risk acceptability and policies for risk mitiga-
tion activities, although these other issues are excluded from risk
assessment (despite data being available that could potentially
contribute to understanding the effects of a speciﬁc hazard on
these factors). Risk communication is deﬁned as the interactive ex-
change of information and opinions concerning risks and risk man-
agement activities between risk assessors, risk managers,
consumers and other interested parties. Interaction occurs be-
tween all three components of the framework.
It is accepted that food control systems are highly unlikely to
deliver a completely risk-free food supply (WHO, 2004). However,
some observers have described the food chain in Western Europe
as having been subject to a ‘paradox of progress’ (Fischer and Fre-
wer, in press). Increasingly strict standards, quality controls and
monitoring procedures have been applied within the agri-food sec-
tor. This has been perceived to correspond with an increasing num-
ber of food safety incidents, which have contributed to a reduction
in consumer conﬁdence in food safety (e.g., Berg, 2004; de Jonge
et al., 2007; Eiser et al., 2002; Frewer et al., 1996; Houghton
et al., 2008; Vos, 2004). Prominent examples include outbreaks of
Escherichia coli in hamburgers (Tuttle et al., 1999), Salmonella in
eggs and poultry (Guard-Petter, 2001; French et al., 2005), Listeria
in pates and soft cheeses (Ramsaran et al., 1998), and accidental or
deliberate contamination of the food chain or speciﬁc food prod-
ucts with toxic compounds, such as dioxin (Verbeke, 2001). The bo-
vine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis can perhaps be singled
out as the most important factor leading to revisions of food safety
policy in recent years (Reilly, 1999; Smith et al., 1999). Concerns
about emerging technologies applied to the agri-food sector (such
as genetic modiﬁcation of crops) have also resulted in problems
with public conﬁdence in food risk analysis (see, for example, Fre-
wer et al., 2004).
Various efforts have consequently been made to bolster societal
conﬁdence in food risk analysis. It has been argued that public trust
in food safety will be facilitated by the functional (and in some in-
stances structural) separation of components in risk analysis, par-
ticularly risk management and risk assessment (Houghton et al.,
2008). This approach has been adopted by various institutions with
responsibility for food safety governance, including EFSA. The ef-
fect on consumer and stakeholder trust has, however, proven
difﬁcult to assess, other than in aggregate terms (for example, by
comparing societal trust ratings in different food safety
institutions).
Other approaches to increasing societal trust in risk analysis
practices have stressed the need to develop effective risk commu-
nication strategies with consumers that explicitly address their
information needs (Houghton et al., 2006; Millstone and Van Zwa-
nenberg, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2007), or propose greater stake-holder involvement (including of consumers) in the overall
process or speciﬁc stages of food risk analysis (Dreyer et al.,
2006; De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999). Greater inclusivity may reﬂect
institutional changes developed to increase the transparency and
openness of regulatory practices (Byrne, 2002; Dreyer et al.,
2006). The institutionalisation of these various strategies have
been rather ad hoc, and their success (e.g. in terms of increasing
public trust) has only been evaluated informally, if at all (e.g.,
Rowe, 2007). How best to operationalise these strategies in the
case of food safety requires further analysis.
There are, other potential limitations to the dominant risk anal-
ysis approach currently applied. Quality of Life parameters in risk
assessment, and other legitimate factors, including societal and
economic factors, tend not to be considered explicitly (Cope
et al., in press) and have not been translated into current practice
in food safety regulation. There is a more general trend in policy
making within the European Commission and beyond concerning
the systematic assessment of economic, social, environmental,
health and ethical factors associated with monitoring provisions
(Dreyer et al., in press). For example, in the area of health impact
assessment, consumption of speciﬁc foods may have both a posi-
tive and a negative health effect. A case in point is provided by ﬁsh
and seafood. Biomagniﬁcation of persistent toxicants in freshwater
and marine food chains provides an important pathway for human
exposure. At the same time, ﬁsh may also constitute an important
source of omega three fatty acids, which provide health beneﬁts
(e.g., Gochfeld and Burger, 2005; Levenson and Axelrad, 2006).
Thus, assessment of health risks and health beneﬁts are both rele-
vant to the governance process. Similarly, quality of life assess-
ment can also be quantiﬁed from a risk–beneﬁt perspective,
taking into account impact on different population segments (de
Blok et al., 2007). Analysis of cost–beneﬁt issues can be made in
the context of environmental, health, and safety regulation (see
for example, Arrow et al., 1997). Arguments can be provided to
support analysis of both ethical costs and beneﬁts associated with
particular courses of (lack of) action (Wilson, 2002).
Given the uncertainties associated with when and how to in-
volve stakeholders, and effectively communicate with the public,
the lack of institutionalised and evaluated processes for promoting
transparency, and the potential for assessment to also include sys-
tematic identiﬁcation of the beneﬁts (as well as risks) associated
with potential food hazards, an improved food risk analysis frame-
work is desirable. The development of a risk analysis framework
that addresses these limitations has been an objective of one par-
ticular EU-funded project, entitled SAFE FOODS.
The SAFE FOODS framework
One aim of the SAFE FOODS project was to develop a risk gov-
ernance framework that explicitly incorporates stakeholder con-
sultation and public participation at appropriate stages in the
process. The framework formally addresses the question of
whether to include risk–beneﬁt assessments, including those
relating to environmental and socio-economic impacts, as well
as ethical issues, and process transparency is emphasised
throughout. The intermediate SAFE FOODS framework is summa-
rised in Fig. 1.
The integrated framework describes an iterative decision pro-
cess with four stages: framing, risk–beneﬁt assessment, evaluation,
and risk management (König et al., submitted for publication). At
the framing stage, interested parties, experts and ofﬁcials with
interests in risk evaluation and management work together to
gain an initial shared understanding of the issue, objectives, and
broad courses of regulatory action. Areas of general agreement
and dissent are documented in order to provide the basis for plan-
ning future decisions. The assessment and terms of reference, and
Fig. 1. The SAFE FOODS framework as used in the Delphi surveys.
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cators are included. The risk–beneﬁt assessment pertains not only
to single pre-identiﬁed risks, but to health impacts in general
(including health beneﬁts), as well as environmental, economic,
social and ethical impacts, and their distribution. The evaluation
stage is an intermediate stage between risk assessment and man-
agement, in which interested parties, experts and ofﬁcials in risk
assessment and management use the assessment outcome to
compare the risks, costs, and beneﬁts and their distribution,
resulting in a report with recommendations on what conse-
quences are deemed acceptable and what risk management mea-
sures may be required, from multiple perspectives. Risk
management includes decision-making, implementation, monitor-
ing and review, and involves the deﬁnition, ranking of alternative
measures, and ﬁnal selection of regulatory options, taking due ac-
count of assessment and evaluation activities. Monitoring indica-
tors are deﬁned based on proposals at the framing stage. Review
pertains not only to the impacts of the decision itself, but also to
the process by which the decision is made, and the legislation un-
der which the issue is regulated.
The three main differences to current frameworks can be de-
scribed as: (1) expansion of the scope of the formal risk assessment
to include distributions of beneﬁts and costs, (2) more formal (and
institutionalised) stakeholder participation, and (3) improved risk
communication and publicly accessible reports at each stage of
the process. The draft framework has been put out for consultation
with key actors and practitioners. Integrating practitioners in the
development of the framework facilitates practicability and en-
hances the chances of adoption.
The remainder of this article deals with the problems of stake-
holder consultation, and the description of one innovative method
for understanding stakeholder views. Finally, what key partici-
pants think about the SAFE FOODS framework is discussed.The problem of gaining expert opinion, and the Delphi technique as a
solution
The SAFE FOODS framework is intended to have widespread
applicability across many countries, with implications for many
types of scientists, policy makers and other stakeholders. This
raises the question of how it is possible to feasibly and validly con-
sult with these diverse and signiﬁcant constituencies in order to
assess their opinions (given that their good opinions are crucial
for the acceptance of the framework). One way to do this is to
physically bring key stakeholders together to debate the frame-
work – and this has, indeed, been done in the context of SAFE
FOODS (see Walls et al., in press). However, this process has major
practical constraints: it is both expensive and difﬁcult to gather in
one place at one time a signiﬁcant number of relevant
stakeholders.
Another way to consult multiple stakeholders is through a sur-
vey. For example, key stakeholders might be sent a description of
the framework and asked their views on it. However, this approach
does not allow for interaction and debate. Survey methodology is
likely to reveal disparate opinions, but cannot offer the prospect
of resolution of differing opinions.
A third technique, the Delphi method, involves a degree of
interactivity and dialogue, as found in group meetings, allied to
the practicability of a survey, with its beneﬁts in terms of cost
and potential access to wider expertise than might otherwise be
attainable (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). The methodology essen-
tially involves the repeated polling of diverse and distributed ex-
perts, the opinions from whom are used as feedback on
subsequent ‘rounds’. The Delphi method has been widely used to
establish consensus regarding many different issues, often among
experts (see, for example, Avery et al., 2005; Childs, 1998; Padel
and Midmore, 2005), as well as to aid forecasting (Halal et al.,
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main of food safety (Green et al., 1993; Henson, 1997; Medeiros
et al., 2001; Menrad, 1999).
In the study presented here, ‘panellists’ (the experts/partici-
pants) were ﬁrst sent a questionnaire about the SAFE FOODS
framework, and then were presented with a second survey with
similar questions, which they were asked to complete, reconsider-
ing their views in the light of the opinions expressed by the other
panellists on the ﬁrst round.
There are a number of notable features about Delphi that need
to be emphasized. First, the feedback provided is kept anonymous
so that panellists do not know who said what, and are assured that
their own opinions remain unattributed. This is a deliberate tactic
to pre-empt the kind of social and political pressures that often
emerge within groups, where decision quality can suffer as a con-
sequence of, for example, people agreeing with authority ﬁgures so
as to avoid sanction or gain some political advantage, or agreeing
with majorities in order to appear part of a group rather than as
a troublesome dissenter. Such processes are well documented
and can lead to ‘process loss’ (inferior judgment and decision mak-
ing compared to certain benchmarks, e.g., Steiner, 1972), and in ex-
treme cases, to outcomes such as ‘groupthink’, which is the
tendency for group members to try to minimize conﬂict and reach
consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating
ideas (e.g., Janis, 1972).
Second, the process aims to achieve a certain degree of consen-
sus or at least general agreement, by collating panellists’ opinions,
with the average on the ﬁnal round taken as the group’s opinion.
The ﬁnal opinion is achieved by the equal weighting of all panel-
lists’ views. Again, in interacting groups, it may be that verbose
or dogmatic individuals have differential input into the ﬁnal deci-
sion – a bias that is not necessarily apt or beneﬁcial. It is also
important to note that consensus is not forced: the correct way
to report the result of a Delphi process is to note the distribution
of responses to indicate signiﬁcant disagreements with the average
view.
Third, there is considerable variation in how the Delphi method
is implemented (Rowe and Wright, 2001). For example, there may
or may not be an unstructured ﬁrst round, in which the panellists
are asked open questions about the nature of the topic of concern
and the appropriateness of the proposed questions. The number of
‘rounds’ can also vary, though rarely goes beyond two or three.
Delphi is also most often used to attain a quantitative representa-
tion of opinions – as in a numerical forecast or a prioritised list of
options – though it can also be used for less-structured problems,
where more emphasis is placed on qualitative arguments gained
from iterated open questions. The nature of feedback often varies,
usually comprising only the mean or median of panellists’ re-
sponses to the prior round, but may also involve justiﬁcations from
panellists for their judgments (Rowe and Wright, 2001).
Fourth, much is unknown about how Delphi ‘works’, i.e. the best
way to apply it, with methodological variability largely stemming
from practitioner uncertainty as opposed to being informed by
empirical evidence of best practice – see Rowe and Wright
(2001) for discussion. For example, regarding feedback, most pub-
lished Delphi studies provide numerical averages of some sort,
although feedback of rationales can lead to more opinion change
than the use of statistics alone (e.g., Rowe andWright, 1996). How-
ever, research into the application of Delphi has indicated most
opinion change occurs following the ﬁrst or second round, and that
increased agreement (as measured by reduced variance of judg-
ments) is a common feature of the process. There is evidence that
the method does lead to improved judgmental quality when com-
pared to interacting groups faced with the same task, and also
when compared to the ﬁrst round average of panellists’ judgments
(i.e. which would be achieved by averaging judgments from re-sponses to a survey) (Rowe and Wright, 1999). This suggests that
Delphi not only provides a practical solution to the problem of
gaining the opinions from distributed experts, but may lead to ‘bet-
ter’ decisions or judgments. For these reasons, it was decided to
run a Delphi process to assess participant views of the SAFE FOODS
framework.Methods
A two-round Delphi was conducted on an initial draft of the
SAFE FOODS framework with all members of the project consor-
tium. This allowed project members to have input into the design
of the framework, and provided a pilot study of the Delphi process
and questions. The framework was reﬁned following the pilot
study (see Fig. 1). The Delphi questionnaire was revised following
the pilot in terms of number of questions, wording, and emphasis.
The Delphi method was actually applied to two sets of partici-
pants: the ﬁrst comprised relevant participants from within the
EU; the second from outside the EU (here termed ‘‘International
non-EU” participants). The participants were initially identiﬁed
by a panel of SAFE FOODS project members on the basis of their
personal knowledge of, and contacts with, key ﬁgures in the food
safety domain. In the initial invitation letter, potential participants
were informed that they would not be identiﬁed by name in any
subsequent publications. Therefore, the Appendix contains a list
of institutions to increase transparency of the study.
Two lists were developed, identifying an equal distribution of
potential participants from four key constituencies: food risk man-
agers, risk assessors, risk communicators (drawn from governmental
institutes, academia and industry) and members of Non-Govern-
mental Organisations (NGOs). Potential panellists received an E-
mail invitation to take part in the Delphi, informing them of the
purpose of the study and what it would involve.
The ﬁrst round Delphi questionnaires were very similar for both
sets of stakeholders (EU and International non-EU), with only a few
differences in phrasing of the introduction text. The second round
questionnaires, which were informed by the responses to the ﬁrst
rounds, diverged across the two stakeholder groups as different
key issues emerged.
Whilst Delphi is often used to obtain quantitative responses to
speciﬁc closed questions, the method has also been used to help
elaborate policy through iterated open questions. The ﬁrst round
Delphi questionnaires thus comprised a combination of open and
closed questions. Where closed questions were used – asking pan-
ellists speciﬁcally whether they agreed or not with some compo-
nent of the SAFE FOODS process – panellists were also asked to
explain their opinions. The second round questionnaire asked fur-
ther questions on new issues that emerged from responses to pre-
vious open questions, plus iterated closed questions, and provided
feedback on the opinions of panellists on the ﬁrst round along with
summaries of the written arguments given by panellists to justify
their responses. Copies of each of the full versions of the question-
naires are available from the authors.
There were, in total, 36 questions in the ﬁrst round. Four were
related to the general framework, including questions about its
comprehensiveness and structure; 16 questions asked about each
of the four stages (four were about the framing stage, three about
the risk assessment stage, two about the evaluation stage, and se-
ven about the risk management stage); 16 questions dealt with a
number of general features of the risk analysis concept, such as
transparency and optimal stakeholder involvement. After approxi-
mately two weeks, panellists were sent E-mail reminders to com-
plete the questionnaire if they had not already done so, repeated
after another week. At approximately six weeks after the start of
the process (for the EU participants – but 10 weeks for Interna-
Table 2
Characteristics of the expert panellists per Delphi survey round (#).
EU International
non-EU
# 1 # 2 # 1 # 2
Gendera Male 21 16 13 9
Female 12 5 4 3
Work experiencea Less than 5 years 1 0 1 1
5–10 years 8 4 1 1
10–20 years 9 9 3 1
More than 20 years 11 8 11 8
Area of expertiseb Policy making 10 7 3 3
Food 19 13 9 9
Health 11 8 5 5
Risk assessment 9 6 8 8
Risk management 5 2 5 5
Risk communication 7 4 3 3
Agriculture 12 9 6 6
Environment 4 1 1 1
Otherc 8 6 1 1
Institutional afﬁliation Academics/scientists 13 10 5 3
Industry 4 2 1 1
International governmental body 4 2 8 4
National governmental body
Non-governmental body 4 3 4 3
5 4 1 1
a Not all participants ﬁlled in this question.
b Participants were permitted to respond to multiple categories to reﬂect their
work activities.
c e.g. Economics; food safety; ethics; statistics/epidemiology; cell biology;
biotechnology.
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naire, along with feedback from the ﬁrst round (the numbers of
participants are provided in Table 1). After the analysis of the ﬁrst
round, the qualitative questions were divided into those where
general agreement of opinion arose or not. General agreement
was deﬁned as occurring when more than 75% of the participants
agreed with a particular issue. A question would be again asked
in the second round if no general agreement arose. Responses to
open questions were analysed using Atlas.ti, a software package
that facilitates textual content analysis. Based on the analysis
new quantitative questions were developed for the second round.
The second questionnaire was shorter than the ﬁrst, in terms of
number of questions, but included considerable feedback text in
the form of lists of panellists’ justiﬁcations for their opinions
and/or summaries of how panellists had responded (i.e. percent-
ages of participants selecting each option). A number of new ques-
tions, based on responses to open questions, were asked to help the
researchers understand panellist views. The questionnaire had
fewer questions because those questions that had achieved very
high ﬁrst round agreement were not reiterated. In the Results sec-
tion answers to a select number of the most interesting and rele-
vant questions are discussed.
The methodology used in the International non-EU participant
Delphi study was similar in process and design to that used in
the EU-Delphi study. The ﬁrst round questions were identical in
both EU and International non-EU Delphi studies, but due to lower
general agreement between the non-EU panellists the number of
questions in the second round was slightly higher for this group.
Furthermore, the second round questions for the latter focused
more on a global, rather than EU, perspective. The Results section
focuses on the levels of agreement and disagreement both within
and between panellists in each of the EU and International non-
EU participant groups.
Results
The most important results of the Delphi survey will be re-
ported, in particular those directly relevant for the functioning of
the SAFE FOODS framework, and those indicating disagreement be-
tween the EU and International non-EU participants.
Sample characteristics
Table 1 shows the number of potential participants identiﬁed
for each Delphi panel within each constituency, as well as the
number of actual participants who took part in the ﬁrst and second
rounds. As can be seen, approximately one-third of those invited
took part in each of the two Delphi studies (i.e. the EU and Interna-
tional non-EU), and of these, approximately two-thirds responded
to the second round questionnaires. These rates of attrition be-
tween rounds are typical of Delphi.
Participant characteristics are detailed in Table 2. There were
more male participants than female (possibly reﬂecting a bias in
the expert population). The majority of participants had more than
10 years’ appropriate work experience, and their areas of expertise
varied widely (see Table 2, and note that participants could select
more than one area of expertise). As well institutional afﬁliations
of participants are provided in Table 2.Table 1
Participants in the European and International non-EU Delphi studies.
Invited Round 1 Round 2
EU participants 106 33 (31%) 21 (64%)
International non-EU participants 60 19 (32%) 12 (63%)The structure of the SAFE FOODS framework
General agreement emerged regarding the need for change in the
current processes of food risk analysis (EU: 78% agreement, 22% dis-
agreement; International non-EU: 94% agreement, 6% disagree-
ment). Analysis of the qualitative responses to this question of
both participant groups revealed views that factors other than
health should be taken into account in risk assessment. Speciﬁcally
assessment of beneﬁts is important, and that better ‘framing’ of is-
sues is needed. International non-EU participants were of the opin-
ion that existing processes for crisis management are inadequate,
and indicated that the communicative interface between risk asses-
sors andriskmanagersneeds tobe improved. Followingon fromthis,
therewas reasonable agreement regarding theproposedorder of the
four stages in the framework (EU: 84% agreement, 6% disagreement;
International non-EU: 74% agreement, 11% disagreement). Further
analysis of the qualitative responses indicated that the role of risk
communication within the framework needs to be clariﬁed.
Less agreement was found regarding the division of the stages.
Participants agreed that there should be a clear distinction be-
tween the tasks conducted by risk assessors and risk managers,
though not all agreed that there should be separate framing and
evaluation stages:
‘‘Although I agree that there should not be such a strict border-
line between risk assessment and risk management, the three
stages Framing, Risk/Beneﬁt Assessment and Evaluation might
[  ] fall under the umbrella of risk assessment.” [EU participant,
round 1]
‘‘Evaluation does not seem like a separate step – it is merely the
conclusion of the risk-beneﬁt assessment.” [International non-
EU participant, round 1]
However, some participants agreed that it is useful to have
interface stages for risk assessors and risk managers to discuss
the implications of risk assessments for their activities.
544 M.T.A. Wentholt et al. / Food Policy 34 (2009) 539–548‘‘Stages where both risk assessors and managers are interactive
are important and cannot be separated as shared planning is
necessary and ‘carry-through’ of risk assessment to manage-
ment is important.” [International non-EU participant, round 1]Table 3
Percentage of participants agreeing to the collection of different types of risk and
beneﬁt assessment data.
Type of Impact Participant Round 1a Round 2
Stakeholder group Risk data Risk data Beneﬁt data
Health impactb EU 93 100 95
Non-Eu 100 100 58
Environmental impact EU 90 95 81
Non-Eu 63 58 50Communication with the public
Both European and International non-EU participants agreed
that uncertainties associated with risk assessment should be com-
municated to the public using simple and understandable lan-
guage (EU: 90% agreement, 3% disagreement; International non-
EU: 94% agreement, 0% disagreement). Furthermore, there was
consensus that this should be done in an open, honest, and trans-
parent way.
Disagreement arose regardingwhat information should be com-
municated, and at which stages of the risk analysis process.
Although European and International non-EU participants agreed
in the ﬁrst round of their respective Delphi surveys that communi-
cation is a priority at the risk management stage (EU: 88% agree-
ment, 12% disagreement; International non-EU: 90% agreement,
0% disagreement), there was considerable disagreement as to what
information should be communicated at other stages. For example:
‘‘If we try to communicate all issues, we will dilute the mes-
sages and lose interest from the public – we need to have some
sort of ﬁlter to decide what should be actively communicated
and what should just be presented passively [  ].” [Interna-
tional non-EU participant, round 1]
‘‘There does not seem to be any clear reason why information
should not be available at each stage.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘The communication will make sense only when enough data
are available, therefore, there is no need to do so in the ﬁrst
three stages.” [International non-EU participant, round 1]
Some concerns were expressed that providing information
about risk at too early a stage in the process would result in unnec-
essary alarm, or establish irreversible misconceptions:
‘‘It might be too early to communicate on premature ﬁndings
and incomplete risk assessments.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘Care should be taken not to alarm the public unnecessarily.”
[EU participant, round 2]
However, some participants indicated that uncertainty associ-
ated with some issues should not be communicated with the
public.
‘‘Communicating uncertainty in full and in a much too open
way [  ] could have a negative impact [on] [  ] scientiﬁc
new developments. It is important to pass the message that sci-
ence is not black and white, evolves continuously and goes
along with uncertainties.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘It is worse to be caught being less than complete, not open or
honest or not transparent, than be understood wrongly. The
ﬁrst costs you your trustworthiness, the second only your efﬁ-
ciency.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘[The] public does not understand the scientiﬁc process, and
deﬁnitely not uncertainty.” [International non-EU participant,
round 1]Social impact EU 73 60 55
Non-Eu 53 42 33
Economic impact EU 80 71 67
Non-Eu 63 42 50
Ethical impact EU 76 68 61
Non-Eu 58 50 42
a Data on beneﬁt assessment was only collected in the second round, based on
responses of participants in the ﬁrst round.
b Please note: the exact phrasing of the item regarding risks was: ‘‘health impact
(‘traditional’ risk assessment)” and for beneﬁts it was: ‘‘health impact”.What type of data should be collected in the assessment stage?
European participants were enthusiastic about collecting risk
assessment data relating to environmental, social, economic and
ethical impacts of potential food hazards, though there was less ap-
proval from International non-EU participants. Table 3 reveals that
almost all participants agreedwith the need to collect health impact
data, as per current practice,while themajority of both EU and Inter-national non-EU participants thought that other types of data
should also be collected. Interestingly, feedback of arguments on
this issue in the second round led to a reduction in support for col-
lection of the other types of data (except for environmental impact
data with EU participants). By the second round, International non-
EU participants who thought that social and economic data should
be collected were reduced to a slight minority, while participants
were evenly split concerning the collection of ethical impact data.
Participants from each group noted that, even if it is desirable to
collect data in addition to health, there is a need to develop meth-
odological innovations in order to so do.
‘‘Methods for analyzing the ﬁrst four types of impacts are fairly
well-developed, although less so in the case of social impacts.
However, this is not true for the last (ethical [impact]), so some
speciﬁcity is required here.” [International non-EU participant,
round 1]
International non-EU participants indicated that, for some of
the impact assessments, the issues are more relevant to the risk
management stage:
‘‘Full social and ethical issues will not become apparent until
after the implementation of any new technology, process or
product. They should be dealt with afterwards as a part of risk
management [  ].” [International non-EU participant, round 1]
‘‘I agree the social, economic and ethical aspect should be con-
sidered but only on a later stage. Otherwise the risk assessment
might be compromised.” [International non-EU participant,
round 1]
It was unclear at the outset of the study as to whether partici-
pants would think it sensible to include consideration of beneﬁts
at the assessment stage. For this reason, round 1 of the survey sim-
ply asked: ‘‘Do you think that data on beneﬁts should also be col-
lected at this stage?” Among EU participants, 84% agreed, 13%
neither agreed nor disagreed, and 3% disagreed, while among the
International non-EU participants, 79% agreed, 5% neither agreed
nor disagreed, and 16% disagreed. The results indicated agreement
with the use of such data, and so questions in round 2 (in both sur-
veys) focused on participants’ opinions regarding the use of the dif-
ferent types of beneﬁts. These results suggested that there was less
agreement between EU and International non-EU participants
regarding whether or not data on beneﬁts should be collected (Ta-
ble 3). The majority of EU participants were in favour of collecting
beneﬁt data at the assessment stage (and were almost unanimous
regarding the collection of health beneﬁt data). International non-
EU participants were far more equivocal. A small majority agreed
with the collection of health beneﬁt data, and participants were
evenly split on whether environmental and economic data should
Table 4
Mean ranking of priorities for different types of impact data (Delphi round 1, on a
scale where rank 1 is most important).
EU mean rank Non-EU mean rank
Health impact 2.63 1.12a
Environmental impact 2.82 3.24b
Social impact 3.18 3.32c
Economic impact 3.02 3.24b
Ethical impact 3.36 4.09d
Note: Means with the same subscript are not signiﬁcantly different. Differences are
signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
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should be collected. Among the negative arguments presented by
International non-EU participants were:
‘‘Beneﬁts are hard to quantify even for health aspects so it is not
clear how this would be used.” [International non-EU partici-
pant, round 1]
‘‘One should not separate risk and beneﬁt. Those who urge
doing so are perhaps suspicious of industry propaganda, and
there are good reasons in the past for such suspicions. The most
important thing is that the trade-offs between risk and beneﬁt
must be analyzed very, very carefully. Also the distribution:
those at risk, and those who beneﬁt, can be very different.”
[International non-EU participant, round 2]
However, even supporters of the general concept (amongst both
EU and International non-EU participants) expressed some uncer-
tainty as to what beneﬁt data should be acquired, when, and how:
‘‘In some cases it may not be necessary, or it may be too difﬁcult
or legally not possible.” [International non-EU participant,
round 1]
‘‘Beneﬁts [  ] [associated with] health and environment should
be considered prior to beneﬁts towards the other aspects [i.e.
Social, economic and ethical].” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘It’s clear from, for example, the GM debate that European con-
sumers must beneﬁt from a risk in order to accept it. Investigat-
ing and communicating beneﬁts will help both policy
development and public decision making.” [EU participant,
round 1]
‘‘It may be difﬁcult to collect beneﬁt data across all areas from
an early stage and in many cases it may not be necessary; it
would be more efﬁcient (resource wise for instance) to ﬁrst
evaluate beneﬁt in the 1 or 2 most obvious areas and then wide-
n. . .” [EU participant, round 1]Table 5a
Which stakeholders should be involved in the risk analysis process at which stage?
(EU participants, round 1).







75 61 75 82
Scientiﬁc institutions 68 82 64 53
Consumer
associations
89 46 68 50
Environmental
organisations
79 54 71 57
Industry 78 57 64 50
Farmers
(organisation)
68 36 50 43
Retailers, trade
organisation
75 43 64 43
Other NGO 64 29 43 32
General public 71 25 46 39What type of data should be collected in the evaluation stage?
It was also interesting to assess participants’ opinions on the use
of non-health types of data in the evaluation stage of the framework.
In the ﬁrst round, participants were asked (in both surveys) to rank
the relative importance of the different types of data (with ‘1’ being
most important). The Friedman rank test indicated that there was a
signiﬁcant difference between the rankings of International non-EU
participants (v2 (4, N = 18) = 40.6, p < 0.001), but not between the
rankings of the European participants (v2 (4, N = 28) = 3.7,
p < 0.4). Post hoc comparisons (Wilcoxon signed rank test for two
related samples) between the International non-EU participants’
data reveals a signiﬁcant difference between the health impact
and all other impact factors (p < 0.001), indicating that health was
ranked more important. The ranking of ethical impact versus social
impact and economic impact were also signiﬁcantly different
(respectively, p < 0.01; p < 0.05), indicating that ethical impact
was rated signiﬁcantly lower than these factors. An overview of
mean rankings of the impact factors can be found in Table 4.
‘‘From the consumer protection perspective health impacts are
most important. But also social aspects (e.g., non-acceptance [of
emerging technologies]) are from our perspective more impor-
tant than environmental aspects.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘All the factors should be weighed equally importantly in the
evaluation... For example, any risk to health is always consid-
ered in relation to the ﬁnancial and economic cost. This is of
course different to specifying that a certain [protection from]
risk has to be achieved no matter what the cost or other
impacts. But this does not happen in reality.” [EU participant,
round 1]Another issue that emerged for some is that consideration of
factors in addition to health should be on a case-by-case basis.
‘‘Healthmust be no. 1 – the foodmust be safe, i.e.,meets the com-
munity’s acceptable level of risk. The ranking of the other factors
will depend on the nature of the issue – inmost cases, not all will
be relevant. . .” [International non-EU participant, round 1]Which stakeholders should be involved and at what stage of the risk
analysis process?
Analysis of qualitative responses indicated that participants
generally agreed that the most important aspect concerning stake-
holder involvement within risk analysis is that involvement be
‘‘case-by-case”. Speciﬁcally, the types of expertise needed and the
extent and nature of stakeholder involvement will be dependent
on the potential hazard under consideration:
‘‘Stakeholder involvement will depend on the issue and
whether they have relevant data and expertise.” [International
non-EU participant, round 1]
In the ﬁrst rounds of both the EU and the International non-EU
Delphi, participants were asked which stakeholders should be in-
volved in which stages. The results are summarised in Tables 5a
and 5b. European participants were in favour of involvement of
all stakeholders, including the general public, at the framing stage.
A similar pattern was observed for the International non-EU stake-
holders, with the exception regarding the involvement of the gen-
eral public or other NGOs. Both European and International non-
EU stakeholders agreed that assessment should be the responsibil-
ity of regulatory institutions and scientiﬁc experts, and that the
general public, farmers and other NGOs should be excluded from
risk assessment.
‘‘The assessment and decision making is properly the responsi-
bility of public agencies. But they can only do their job if they
Table 5b
Which stakeholders should be involved in the risk analysis process at which stage?
(International non-EU participants, round 1).







100 75 88 94
Scientiﬁc institutions 81 94 75 69
Consumer
associations
75 31 50 81
Environmental
organisations
63 25 44 56
Industry 75 44 50 75
Farmers
(organisation)
75 25 50 75
Retailers, trade
organisation
63 25 44 81
Other NGO 56 12 37 69
General public 56 12 31 75
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holders.” [International non-EU participant, round 2]
The International non-EU participants suggested that other
stakeholders could participate at a less ‘‘expert” level (for example,
by collecting and delivering data to the expert communities with
responsibility for assessment). European participants were unde-
cided about the inclusion of the general public, farmers and ‘‘other
NGOs” at the evaluation phase. In contrast, the International non-
EU stakeholders emphasised the role of expertise in evaluation
(regulatory bodies and scientists). Regarding risk management,
European stakeholders favoured inclusion of regulatory institu-
tions and exclusion of the general public and ‘‘other NGOs”,
whereas the International non-EU participants favoured a much
broader range of stakeholder input into the risk management
stage, and were only undecided about the inclusion of environ-
mental NGOs in risk management.
‘‘There should be a responsible group for risk management, and
no diffusion of responsibility. In all other stages, a broad consul-
tation process seems to be helpful.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘If EFSA or some other part of the EC/EU or national government
is equipped to do the entire risk analysis process, that group
should do the major parts of the work. Other groups have some
role to play in the ‘‘framing” stage, or in reporting risk informa-
tion in the risk management stage.” [International non-EU par-
ticipant, round 2]Challenges for implementation of the SAFE FOODS framework
As one participant put it:
‘‘All new processes are a challenge. . .” [EU participant, round 1]
In an open question in the ﬁrst round, participants were asked
to state what they saw as the main challenges to the implementa-
tion of the SAFE FOODS framework. One concern voiced was that
the framework would be time consuming and labour intensive to
apply (with commensurate cost issues). It would thus be important
to demonstrate that the framework could operate within an
acceptable time frame before regulatory uptake could occur.
‘‘Due to the involvement of more stakeholders/groups and more
risk/beneﬁt assessments the timing gets extended and planning
is even more important.” [EU participant, round 1]
‘‘This type of framework moves towards a muchmore participa-
tory process. Many individuals involved in regulation have little
experience with working in such a manner. Another main chal-lenge will be striking a balance between having a framework
and process that improves legitimacy, but that is still ﬂexible
and affordable.” [EU participant, round 1]
Doubts were also raised as to whether the new framework
could be operationalised to respond quickly and sufﬁciently if a
food safety ‘‘crisis” were to occur. This is especially important gi-
ven that a number of participants suggested that the framework
is inappropriate for routine food risk analysis and established food
hazards. Consequently there is a need to stipulate criteria for
determining under what circumstances the new framework should
be applied (identifying ‘triggers’), and potential ‘‘candidate” haz-
ards ought to be identiﬁed on a case-by-case basis.
‘‘I do not see a ‘‘fast track” procedure for crises situations where
actions have to be quick e.g. a screening group that remains on
the alert at all times. Transparency is very important but could
be time consuming.” [International non-EU participant, round 1]
The European group was particularly concerned with problems
relating to hazard identiﬁcation, especially under conditions where
the hazard is poorly characterised. It was recognised that, within
the EU, a risk–beneﬁt communication strategy would have to be
developed that was appropriate to the needs of different EU mem-
ber states and the ‘‘cultural diversity” encompassed with the EU
structure.
Some participants suggested that the SAFE FOODS framework is
not novel, and that similar approaches are being developed
elsewhere:
‘‘I do not think the SAFE FOODS risk analysis framework is that
much different from frameworks promoted by Codex and other
groups. The bigger challenge is where such risk analysis frame-
works and (most importantly) some form of infrastructure that
they need to be built on to make them effective is non-existent.”
[EU participant, round 1]
However, others (especially International non-EU participants)
suggested that the framework is signiﬁcantly different, but that
in consequence this could cause problems on account of difﬁculties
in harmonisation with existing International non-EU frameworks.
‘‘It does not correspond to the Codex Risk analysis framework –
will be difﬁcult for the 165 non-EU countries in the world to
understand why EU needs a special framework different from
everybody else’s.” [International non-EU participant, round 1]
In line with this, one participant suggested that the need to in-
crease food safety resource allocations to operationalise the frame-
work might also have an impact on European trading partners and
developing countries if additional barriers to trade were identiﬁed.Discussion
In this paper an improved risk analysis framework for use in the
food domain has been described, along with the results of a major
stakeholder consultation exercise about its perceived merits and
deﬁcits. The Delphi method used to enact this consultation was
found to be an extremely useful mechanism in enabling the sur-
veying of multiple experts from around the world who would
not otherwise have been able to meet on a face-to-face basis. How-
ever, the complexity of the SAFE FOODS framework, and the num-
ber of questions that potentially could have been asked, suggest
that there may have been value in having a third round of the sur-
vey to clarify views further (particularly as the ﬁrst round con-
tained many qualitative questions seeking to establish what the
real issues really were). However, it was felt that this would have
yielded diminishing returns, particularly in terms of expert partic-
M.T.A. Wentholt et al. / Food Policy 34 (2009) 539–548 547ipation. Two rounds seem ideal, though in future the methodmight
beneﬁt from an initial face-to-face qualitative stage (such as using
a workshop with only a few experts) to clarify the major issues,
which might then be focused on subsequently in a couple of largely
quantitative Delphi rounds. The authors aim to look into develop-
ing such a novel method in future.
What was notable was that most of the novel concepts in the
SAFE FOODS framework were acceptable to many of the experts,
though EU experts seemed somewhat more positive, in general,
than International non-EU experts. Thus, there was a certain sup-
port for the idea of including other aspects of risk than health in
the assessment and analysis process, as well as including beneﬁt
information. There was general support for increasing the role of
other stakeholders in the overall risk analysis process at speciﬁc
points in the risk analysis process. One issue that arose was that
the use of the different new elements proposed should be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis. This, adds another level of complexity
to the process, and perhaps needs to be explicitly considered with-
in the framework – whether early on, or at particular stages.
This study has shown that the majority of the participants con-
sulted in this study believe that implementing the proposed risk
analysis framework amendments may result in better food risk
governance and increased public trust in risk governance practices.
At the same time, participants acknowledged that new tools and
methods are needed to accommodate these improvements.
Encouraging in this regard is the observation that governmental
institutions have already started implementing various new ele-
ments as described in the SAFE FOODS framework. It is inevitable
that implementation of improvements will take time and may dif-
fer in details between institutions. The outcome of the SAFE FOODS
project may be helpful to identify those elements in risk analysis
that will potentially beneﬁt from international harmonisation.
Conclusions
There was considerable support for many of the new principles
encompassed by the SAFE FOODS framework, but some uncer-
tainty was expressed regarding how, in practice, these might be
enacted. For example, there was some discussion regarding how
stakeholders should be involved, the appropriate methodological
approaches required to measure risks and beneﬁts associated with
the different impact factors (including health), and how these dif-
ferent factors should be weighted in the risk analysis process. The
results from this survey raise further questions regarding the oper-
ationalisation of the framework, though they do suggest that it is
worth persevering with. It would be naïve to expect that a ‘better’
framework will necessarily supplant one already institutionalised
unless there is considerable stakeholder and end-user acceptance
of the new approach. A ﬁnal conclusion relates to the difference be-
tween stakeholder acceptance and institutional implementation
and harmonisation in institutional application. It is also clear that
a guidance is needed regarding when to do what (for example, in
the framing phase stakeholders will proﬁle the problem hence
determine what activities are needed to solve the speciﬁc problem
at hand). The issue of implementation lies, therefore, less with reg-
ulatory acceptance, but rather with operationalising speciﬁc insti-
tutional activities.
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Appendix
Institutional afﬁliations of participants in the study (divided
over the EU participant group and non-EU participant group).
EU participants
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI)
AgroBioInstitute
College of Agriculture Food and Rural Enterprise (CAFRE)
Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU (CIAA)
Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA)
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV)
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
ESRC – Centre for Genomics in Society
EuroCommerce
EuroCOOP
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (UEAPME)
European Commission – DG Enterprise and Industry
European Commission – DG Research
European commission – DG SANCO
European Food Information Council
Finnish Farmers’ and Forest Owners’ Union (MTK)
International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI Europe)
Juelich Centre
Karolinska Institutet
Ministry of Agriculture of Latvia
Nestlé
Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics in Science
and Technology (NENT)
Ospedale Luigi Sacco University






Agricultural Economics Research Institute
AgroBioInstitute
College of Agriculture Food and Rural Enterprise (CAFRE)
Non-EU participants
Bayer CropScience
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Centre for Food Safety (Hong Kong)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Food Standards Australia New Zealand
Ibaraki Prefectural University of Health Science
Joint FAO/IAEA Division (AGE)
National Food Research Institute – Slovakia Republic
New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research Limited
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD)
PRIMAFF
South Africa National Consumers Union
Universidad de Chile
University of Ottawa
World Health Organisation (WHO)
Zhejiang University
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